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UNCITRAL and the enforceability of 
iMSAs: the debate heats up – Part 4 
Anna Howard (Associate Editor), Nadja Alexander (Editor) and Dorcas QuekAnderso
n 
  
“…the mounting global hubbub surrounding mediation, and highly varied perc
eptions regardingthe nature and value of mediation, underscore the need for t
houghtful conversation anddeliberate reflection on present trends and tendenc
ies. The failure to periodically step back andtake stock of where we are and w
here we are going increases the likelihood of behavioural ‘drift’– that is, action 
that becomes increasingly reflexive as opposed to deliberate.” Thomas J.Stipa
nowich,  ‘The International Evolution of Mediation: a call for dialogue and
 deliberation‘ 
 
As the 65th session of the UNCITRAL Working Group II on arbitration and con
ciliation draws to aclose today, so too does our series of posts which has refle
cted on the issues likely to have beendiscussed and debated in Vienna. In this
 fourth and final post we consider the application of anarbitration enforcement 
framework to international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs)particularl
y in light of recent trends in international arbitration. 
Stipanowich’s appeal above to reflective, rather than reflexive, action has broa
d resonance. Inthis post, we focus on the potential relevance of these words t
o the current reliance oninternational arbitration to offer up a solution for the all
egedly low levels of internationalmediation. 
At the risk of over-
simplification, the argument goes that it was the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1957 (the New York 
Convention) thatestablished, and sustains, international arbitration as a popul
ar dispute resolution process forinternational disputes. So, if this worked – and
 works – for international arbitration, why not adoptsomething similar for intern
ational mediation which, it seems, is not enjoying such popularity? Ithas been 
argued that until international mediation enjoys an equivalent enforcement me
chanism,international mediation will remain less attractive than arbitration. 
Some questions 
There is, of course, the threshold question of whether we can attribute internat
ional arbitration’srise to prominence and popularity solely to the New York Con
vention: what else might have ledto, and sustains, arbitration as a popular choi
ce for international dispute resolution? 
There is then the question of whether it is appropriate to look to international a
rbitration for a wayin which to increase the uptake of international mediation gi
ven the fundamental differencesbetween these two dispute resolution process
es. Put simply, what worked for arbitration mightnot work for the very different 
process of mediation. As noted in our second post, theconsensual and volunt
ary nature of mediation – in contrast to the adjudicatory nature ofarbitration – c
alls into question the need for an enforcement mechanism. Given that the parti
esthemselves determine whether or not they reach a settlement, and the term
s of any suchsettlement, there may well be a likelihood of compliance with the 
settlement. Indeed, this pointhas recently been noted by the European Commi
ssion in its report on the EC Directive onmediation in civil and commercial ma
tters: “Mediation can provide a cost-
effective and quickextrajudicial resolution of disputes in civil and commercial 
matters through processes tailored tothe needs of the parties. It is more likely t
hat parties voluntarily comply with agreements resultingfrom mediation. These
 benefits are even more pronounced in cross-border situations.” 
And finally, there is the question – which, it seems, has not received much atte
ntion – of what arethe present trends and tendencies in international arbitratio
n which might inform UNCITRALWorking Group II’s continuing discussions on 
a proposed convention on the enforceability ofiMSAs. It is this issue which will 
be the focus of the remainder of this post. 
Present trends and tendencies 
So, what is happening in the international arbitration arena which may be of re
levance? 
Recent research by the School of International Arbitration of Queen Mary Uni
versity of Londonidentified that: “A growing concern in international arbitration 
is a perceived reluctance bytribunals to act decisively in certain situations for f
ear of the award being challenged on the basisof a party not having had the c
hance to present its case fully (‘due process paranoia’).” (page 2) 
Queen Mary’s study adds that “Many interviewees described situations where 
deadlines wereextended, fresh evidence was admitted late in the process, or 
other disruptive behaviour bycounsel was condoned due to what was perceive
d to be a concern by the tribunal that the awardwould otherwise be vulnerable 
to challenge. Notably, even arbitrators identified this phenomenonas both prob
lematic and commonplace. Indeed, many revealed in interviews that this conc
ernhas influenced decisions they have made when sitting as arbitrator. Intervi
ewees were generallysympathetic to the reasons behind the tribunals’ caution.
 However, they often expressed the viewthat some of arbitration’s more preval
ent problems, such as lack of speed and increased cost, arepartly rooted in thi
s due process paranoia.” (page 10) 
Why is this recent trend in international arbitration relevant to our discussions 
on a convention onthe enforceability of iMSAs? 
First, it reminds us that an enforcement convention cannot guarantee direct en
forcement: therewill be limited grounds, as there are under the New York Con
vention, under which theenforcement of an iMSA could be challenged. So, if p
arties to iMSAs tend not to comply with theiragreements – as seems to be sug
gested by the push towards a convention on the enforceabilityof iMSAs, thoug
h there appears to be no empirical data to support this – a convention may not
necessarily bring an end to any such problems of compliance. Put simply, and
 perhaps cynically,there will still be wriggle room even with such a convention. 
If the parties wish to renege on theiragreement, an enforcement mechanism m
ay not prevent them from doing so. 
Secondly, as the research has identified, grounds for challenge can affect – or
 we might sayinfect – the process, in the case of international arbitration resulti
ng in what has been termed“due process paranoia.” One of the draft grounds 
of challenge to direct enforcement whichUNCITRAL is currently considering fo
r iMSAs certainly has a “due process” flavour to it. Article8(1)(e) of UNCITRAL
’s draft instrument states: 
“The conciliator failed to maintain fair treatment of the parties, or did not disclo
se circumstanceslikely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to its impartiality or i
ndependence.” 
Can we sense a collective concern? How will “fair treatment of the parties” be 
determined? Coulda mediator spending more time with one party in caucus se
ssions (where the mediator meetsseparately with each party) be unfair treatm
ent of the other party? And what about a perceptionthat a mediator reality test
s one party’s view more than another’s? Is that unfair – or fair –
treatment? And who will determine “fair”? How will the requirement to treat par
ties fairly –
whatever that might mean – alter the way in which mediators mediate? What 
might fall within“circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the 
mediator’s impartiality orindependence?” At what point does a doubt become “
justifiable”? And there are morequestions… 
As noted in our second post, there are characteristics of the mediation proces
s which raisesignificant challenges for any basis of challenge to direct enforce
ment which touches upon theway in which mediation is conducted. These cha
racteristics include the confidential nature ofmediation, its flexibility, its volunta
ry nature, the focus on party self-
determination and, of course,the use of caucus sessions. As UNCITRAL Work
ing Group II continues to review the draftinstrument on direct enforceability of i
MSAs, the current trend of “due process paranoia” ininternational arbitration e
ncourages us to continue to ask how the various grounds of challengemight sit
 with the unique characteristics, and opportunities, of the mediation process. 
Reflexive or reflective action? 
If there is a tendency for parties to not comply with iMSAs – though there does
 not seem to beempirical data which suggests that this is the case – is a conve
ntion on the enforceability ofiMSAs the only, or the best, way in which to addre
ss this tendency? Might we be being “reflexive”in borrowing one element (an e
nforcement mechanism) from international arbitration to address asupposed p
roblem with international mediation? If there is an issue with compliance, in ad
ditionto considering a convention on the enforceability of iMSAs, might we als
o try to establish whyparties choose to not comply with their agreements? Cou
ld we look more broadly to the variousstages and elements of the mediation pr
ocess, for example, how the parties entered into theprocess, how it was condu
cted and how it was concluded, for insights into the reasons whyparties reneg
e on their agreements? We could then seek to address these reasons. Adopti
ng anexternal enforcement mechanism might not be the only – or most effecti
ve – way to reduce thelikelihood that parties will walk way from their agreeme
nts. And, if we think of the broaderpurpose of a convention on the enforceabilit
y of iMSAs, such a convention might not be the only– or best – way to promot
e cross-border mediation. 
There has been much for UNCITRAL’s Working Group II to consider in Vienna
. We will eagerlyawait the outcome of these discussions. 
 
